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of the system 
In this paper, I intend to emphasize aspects of 
the present system of international economic 
relations in the monetary and financial area that 
create difficulties for an adequate insertion of 
Latin America in the world economy. I do not 
propose to make a comprehensive study of all 
transfers of resources between developed and 
developing countries. 
My comments will be arranged under 
three main headings: the workings of the 
present international monetary system; the 
effect of the present system on Latin American 
countries and less developed countries in 
general, and changes in the system that could 
help to minimize the present difficulties. 
Generalized floating of currencies became 
unavoidable as the Bretton Woods system 
proved incapable of providing enough adjust-
ment incentives for reserve currency countries, 
essentially the United States and the countries 
with surpluses. In fact, IMF "discipline" could 
only apply to non-reserve-currency deficit 
countries. Reserve currency deficit countries 
could finance their deficits with their own 
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currency, while countries with surpluses did 
not need to request IMF assistance. 
The lack of international incentives to 
adjust created a situation where convertibility 
in terms of gold could not be maintained, and 
the Bretton Woods system collapsed. As a 
matter of fact, the lack of adjustment incentives, 
together with some domestic banking regula-
tions, gave rise to an explosive growth of 
private financial markets as financial inter-
mediation between surplus and deficit coun-
tries became more and more in demand. Be-
tween 1973 and 1978 the net size of the Euro-
currencies market grew at a rate of about 19% 
per year. 
Those changes are not only important 
quality-wise, however: they also represent a 
complete qualitative transformation of the 
system. 
1. The role of the monetary authorities 
and of the private sector 
The first important qualitative change is that 
wich took place in the market intervention role 
and reserve holdings of the monetary authori-
ties versus those of the private sector. In a fixed 
exchange rate system, the authorities have to 
maintain exchange rates through intervention 
in the market, for which purpose they must 
hold foreign exchange, gold and SDR reserves. 
In a floating system, such a role is transferred 
totally or partially to the private sector, and it is 
the latter which has an incentive to accumulate 
"reserves" in order to "intervene" in foreign 
exchange markets. 
This fact implies a higher sensitivity, or 
elasticity, of the composition of reserves to 
economic incentives. Usually, central banks 
are less sensitive to changes in expectations 
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than private holders of foreign exchange. The 
latter tend to adjust the composition of their 
holdings rapidly when relative interest rates or 
exchange rates are expected to vary. Hence, the 
more important the role of private holders in 
foreign exchange markets, the faster will be the 
reaction to changes in expectations. The expec-
tation of devaluation of a reserve currency —or 
a currency important in international trade— 
brings about an immediate change in the 
composition of assets and liabilities of the 
private sector and this helps to produce the 
expected devaluation. In a sense, it could be 
said that under the present system, since 
central banks cannot resist the pressure of 
private speculators, generalized expectations 
will never be wrong. 
Another consequence of the increased 
importance of the private sector in intervention 
is a relative reduction in the demand for SDRs. 
In fact, SDRs cannot be held by the private 
sector, but insofar as the relative importance of 
private "reserve" currency holdings increases, 
the demand for SDRs will decrease relative to 
that for currrencies. All this has important 
implications for the system as a whole (the 
implications for LDGs will be developed later). 
(a) Exchange rate changes tend to "over-
shoot the mark", so that the magnitudes of such 
changes tend to be relatively large. It has been 
observed that prices tend to react faster than 
quantities to exchange rate changes in indus-
trial countries. Thus, when a particular cur-
rency suffers a devalution, the export prices of 
the devaluing country tend to fall and import 
prices to rise soon after devaluation, but export 
and import volumes react more slowly, so that, 
for a time, a devaluation increases the imbal-
ance it was suppossed to correct. Private hold-
ers of the currency will see their devaluation 
expectations reinforced, and the exchange rate 
will reflect such strengthened expectations 
with further devaluation. Then, after some 
time, the effect of devaluation will show itself 
in the balance of payments, in the form of a 
relative reduction of imports as compared to 
exports, and the opposite process will be 
generated. As this process is better understood 
and the pattern of events repeats itself, the 
private sector may "learn" to speculate better 
and the destabilizing effect of expectations 
formed in the way described above should tend 
to dissappear. The length of the learning period 
is, however, unknown. 
(b) The degree of stringency of monetary 
policy becomes more difficult to evaluate. Let 
us take, for example, a German-based company 
that holds US dollars in its assets. If such a 
company expects a reduction in the value of the 
dollar relative to the German mark, it will try to 
sell its dollars for marks, while if the Bundes-
bank wants to give at least partial support to the 
dollar to avoid an excessive strengthening of 
the mark, it will buy the dollars in exchange for 
marks. The figures in Germany will show an 
increase in the money supply, whereas all that 
has happened is a change in the composition of 
assets of the German-based company. There is 
no reason for this action to change the desired 
spending pattern of the company, so that the 
increase in the money supply in Germany will 
have no direct inflationary effect. Of course, the 
real world is not this simple, but I hope that 
this example serves to illustrate the essence of 
my argument. 
(c) Exchange rates become more volatile 
through changes in transactions on capital 
account (capital flows). If private capital and 
money markets are well developed, with 
reserves diversified in terms of currencies, 
changes in expectations will affect the market 
rapidly and fully: desired changes in the 
composition of assets and liabilities of eco-
nomic agents will be reflected in market 
actions which will result in changes in ex-
change rates. The money markets for devel-
oped countries' currencies are sufficiently 
deep to allow the operation of a futures market 
where interested parties can buy "coverage" 
for exchange risks. With or without coverage, 
however, changes in domestic interest rates or 
other factors affecting the desired composition 
of assets and liabilities will tend to produce 
sizable capital movements, unless interest rate 
policy is closely associated with expected 
exchange rates. Such association is very diffi-
cult to achieve in practice, so exchange rates 
must be expected to vary sharply in short 
periods of time. 
Furthermore, changes produced through 
the capital account may tend to reinforce those 
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in the current account. An unfavourable 
current account will produce devaluation 
expectations. At the same time, the expected 
cost of borrowing abroad or the expected 
benefit of external investment will increase 
(due to the expected devaluation), producing as 
a consequence an imbalance in the capital 
account with the same sign as that in the 
current account. Since, as pointed out above, 
the adjustments in the current account come 
about only slowly, one must expect relatively 
sharp movements in exchange rates on this 
account, on at least a movement in a particular 
direction for some time and then a reversal, in 
a cycle which will take two or three years to 
develop fully. 
(d) Sharp changes in exchange rates help 
to stimulate protectionist tendencies in world 
trade. As some currencies appreciate, the 
issuing countries will face some loss of com-
petit iveness, while deficit countries, whose 
currencies depreciate, tend to yield more 
easily to protectionist lobbyists on balance-of-
payments grounds. Thus, global resistance to 
protectionism is substantially weakened, and if 
at the same time, for this and other reasons, the 
world economy is expanding slowly, the stage 
is set for the proliferation of direct controls, 
regulations and increased tariffs on trade. 
2. The international transmission of 
economic disturbances 
With fixed exchange rates, it was expected that 
inflation rates in the world would tend towards 
equality, since it was argued that any dis-
crepancy would bring about imbalances in 
foreign payments that would force adjustment. 
As exchange rates were not completely fixed, 
however, some discrepancy in inflation rates 
was allowed for, over and above that coming 
from different rates of change in productivity. 
Between 1960 and 1970 the average yearly rate 
of inflation for 9 industrial countries' was 3.5%, 
with a standard deviation of 1.5 and a coef-
ficient of variability of 0.43. Floating, it was 
argued, would allow for more freedom in 
domest ic monetary policy, since variation in 
1
 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Nether lands, Uni ted Kingdom and United States. 
exchange rates would insulate countries from 
external shocks. On these grounds, rates of 
inflation should have diverged after 1973 more 
than they did before, and particularly before 
1970. 
However, empirical evidence does not lend 
support to this expectation. For the same 9 
countries considered, yearly inflation between 
1974 and 1977 averaged 11.3%, with a standard 
deviation of 4.8 and a coefficient of variability 
of 0.42; i.e., practically indentical to that 
prevailing in the 1960s, while for the period 
1970-1973 —a transitional period— the average 
rate of inflation was 6.5%, with a standard 
deviation of 1.7 and a coefficient of variability 
of 0.26. I t therefore looks as though floating 
rates have not helped very much to insulate 
countries from external disturbances. An 
alternative hypothesis, which I have put 
forward elsewhere, could be formulated to 
explain this behaviour. For our purposes, it is 
sufficient to point out that floating has not 
insulated countries from external shocks. 
Floating is no substitute for responsible do-
mestic policies. 
3. Creation of international liquidity 
The present system has considerably obscured 
the concept of international liquidity itself. 
When the authorities accumulated most of their 
external reserves the concept was clear-cut. 
But as soon as the private sector assumed, 
partly or wholly, the responsibility for inter-
vening in the market, the concept of interna-
tional liquidity became vague and ill-defined. 
Should it be only official reserves which were 
considered? Or should one take account of 
private holdings in some way? These questions 
are not academic, for the difference between 
official holdings and "total" holdings of foreign 
exchange —and gold and SDRs— is enormous 
(the second is at least twice the first). 
In a floating system, it is legitime to 
consider private holdings of foreign exchange 
as "international liquidity", since there should 
be a demand in the private sector for such 
holdings, and if the demand is not satisfied, the 
private sector will look for ways to satisfy it, 
even creating new liquidity instruments. In a 
world where the foreign exchange operations 
of banks in industrial countries and offshore 
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centres are usually not subjected to the same 
types of controls as their domestic currency 
operations, the supply of international liquidi-
ty becomes demand-determined. And insofar 
as the foreign exchange holdings of the private 
sector are a good substitute for domestic (or 
national) money, changes in the supply of the 
first will affect the demand for the second. 
Through this process, national central banks 
lose control over the relevant monetary aggre-
gates. This is not because they cannot control 
the supply of domestic money in the short run, 
but because the demand for such money chan-
ges, with the result that control or regulation 
not only of the rate of growth of international 
liquidity, but also of liquidity in general, 
becomes much less effective. Of course, if the 
supply of liquidity in the form of foreign 
exchange becomes essentially demand-deter-
mined, the relative importance of SDRs is 
bound to suffer. 
II 
The effects on Latin American and other 
developing countries 
As the system, or lack of it, works at present, 
one must expect relatively sharp and recurrent 
variations in the exchange rates of the principal 
currencies. Most Latin American countries, as 
well as other less developed countries (LDCs), 
peg their own currencies to one or another of 
the principal currencies, or to a basket of them. 
Pegging is necessary because most LDCs do 
not have financial or money markets deep 
enough to do otherwise, the Central Bank 
being the only entity capable of absorbing 
short-run excess supply or demand for the 
domestic currency. But pegging means that the 
domestic currency moves together with the 
currency or currencies to which it is pegged, 
and the fluctuations of those currencies are 
geared to the adjustment needs of the issuing 
countries, not of the pegging country. Hence, 
floating imposes a cost on LDCs in terms of 
destabilizing influences on their economies. 
Floating also tends to discourage the allocation 
of additional resources to the production of 
tradeable goods, since an uncertainty element 
is introduced in all calculations regarding 
activities connected with foreign trade. In most 
cases, the LDCs exporters cannot even buy 
coverage, because there is no futures market for 
their own currencies. 
There are more deep-seated problems 
than this, however. Thus, if floating does not 
insulate countries from external shocks, it does 
not solve the adjustment problem in the short 
or medium run either, and may even compli-
cate it. As everyone knows, if there is a group of 
countries running a protracted surplus on 
current account, there must be another group 
running a deficit, and floating will not correct 
the situation. Floating could perhaps equi-
librate the balance of payments as a whole, in 
the long run, but it might never produce 
equilibrium in the balance-of-payments cur-
rent account. As we have already seen, the 
short-run effect of floating on the current 
account of the balance of payments and on the 
balance of payments as a whole may actually be 
destabilizing. 
As a matter of fact, equilibrium on the 
current account is not an ideal situation. Non-
oil-exporting developing countries are net ca-
pital importers, so that the desired position of 
their current account is one of deficit, to be 
financed with a surplus on the capital account. 
In the case of Latin America, the average deficit 
on the current account of the non-oil-exporting 
countries for the period 1974-1978 is five times 
larger than for the period 1966-1970. The 
capital surplus should be high enough to cover 
the deficit on the current account and the 
necessary increase in reserve holdings. But a 
surplus on the capital account is only a more 
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respectable way to refer to a net increase in 
foreign debt, since unrequited transfers are 
negligible and direct foreign investment is not 
on the increase and is concentrated in a few 
countries. At all events, new net indebtedness 
accounts for at least 80% of the surplus on the 
capital account of the non-oil-exporting Latin 
American countries. 
Table 1 
EXTERNAL FINANCING OF LATIN AMERICAN NON-OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
(Billions of dollars) 
Deficit on current account4 
Increase in reserves" 
Use of external financing (uses) 




Loans from official sources 
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Bilateral 
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Sources: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; Bank for International Settlements: supple-
ments for July and December 1978 and Yearbook; CEPAL estimates. 
aExcluding official donations. 
Positive figure indicates an increase in reserves. 
^Includes long, medium and short-term non-compensatory and compensatory loans. 
dAll figures for 1978 are provisional. 
Table 2 
ESTIMATED OVERALL INDEBTEDNESS 
OF LATIN AMERICAN NON-OIL-
EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
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Despite the levels already reached by such 
debt (over 100 billion dollars for the non-oil-
exporting countries of Latin America by the 
end of 1978) it must go on increasing for many 
years if the development process is to continue 
and if world resources are to be more efficiently 
allocated. The additional short-run instability 
in the balance of payments which is a by-
product of floating, however, does not facilitate 
official decisions in industrial countries about 
long-term development finance, while private 
financial markets expand rapidly. Thus, the 
terms of the new financing are substantially 
worse than those of the past, both in terms of 
interest rates and of amortizations schedules. 
" D e b t burden" becomes a problem for further 
borrowing, a problem which is more a con-
sequence of the present system than of "mis-
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behaviour", even though the latter is not 
always absent. Moreover, as debt terms dete-
riorate, borrowing countries need to increase 
their reserve holdings, both in order to present 
a better " image" and in order to be ready to 
offset possible outflows. So, as the terms dete-
riorate, the necessary rate of accumulation of 
reserves tends to grow, and so does the neces-
sary net borrowing per year. 
An obvious way out of this problem for 
LDCs would be to expand exports. If exports 
grew at a rapid rate, both the "debt burden" 
and the current account deficit could be re-
duced. However, as pointed out above, in the 
present circumstances the developed countries 
tend to yield more easily to protecionist pres-
At least some of the roots of the difficulties 
pointed out above can be traced to problems of 
the adjustment process and of liquidity crea-
tion. If the adjustment process worked smooth-
ly, and international liquidity grew at a rea-
sonably stable rate, excessive fluctuating of 
exchange rates would be flattened out and 
there woud be less of a weakening of the will to 
resist protectionist measures. 
One could argue that the adjustment 
process is working smoothly when the choice 
be tween fixed or floating exchange rates be-
comes irrelevant. In other words, if the domes-
tic policies of the main industrial countries 
were strictly co-ordinated, there would be no 
need to vary their exchange rates vis-à-vis each 
other in the short run, and there would there-
fore be no need for floating. I hope it is obvious 
by now how great an interest LDCs have in 
more stable exchange rates and a smoother 
adjustment process. 
But of course close co-ordination of domes-
tic policies is an ideal which is very difficult to 
reach. Different countries have different insti-
tutions, different interest groups and different 
sures, so that this way out does not seem to be 
feasible. In fact, a recent article in IMF Survey 
reaches the conclusions that protectionism has 
increased significantly in the recent past, and 
the trend does not show signs of abating.2 
Regrettably, this trend has emerged precisely 
when a good number of LDCs, at least in Latin 
America, are following an outward-oriented 
strategy. 
This strategy, to be succesful, requires two 
prerequisites: foreign markets and foreign fi-
nance. The former are being increasedly pro-
tected from outside competition. The latter is 
available, but on terms thatare compatible only 
with a rapid growth of LDC exports. 
social and political forces. For example, some 
countries can export their unemployed and so 
can accept more restrictive economic policies 
than others. 
However difficult it is, I believe one 
should continue trying to secure closer co-
ordination of economic policies among indus-
trial countries. Naturally, such co-ordination 
should take global needs into account, so as to 
facilitate the necessary current account deficit 
of the LDCs ant its adequate financing. In this 
way, a smoother process of real resource trans-
fers would be achieved. In order to ensure the 
consideration of global needs, LDCs should be 
represented in some way in discussions on 
policy co-ordination among industrial coun-
tries. 
Reports that take a global look at the world 
economy play an important role here. For 
example, the excellent IMF periodic reports on 
the world economic outlook should be given 
wider circulation. The Interim Committee of 
2
"Retreat from liberal trade becomes clearer as more 
restrictive practices take effect", IMF Survey, April 9,1979. 
I l l 
What can be done to solve, or at least alleviate, 
the present difficulties in the monetary 
and financial system? 
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the Board of Governors of the Fund should 
perhaps devote at least one full meeting a year 
to evaluating and discussing the world econo-
mic situation. But policy co-ordination touches 
some very sensitive points in many countries, 
and for this reason it requires some degree of 
regular involvement of governments at the 
highest political level. 
At the same time, however, improving the 
adjustment process is in the interests of all 
countries, developing and developed alike. 
All the effort expended in attaining the 
goal of policy co-ordination is well spent. 
However , one cannot expect such efforts to be 
fully effective alone, so some action should be 
taken in especially difficult areas even before 
co-ordination is improved: 
(a) Asset settlement of international obliga-
tions should be established, in order to create 
an incentive for reserve currency countries to 
adjust. 
If asset settlement were the norm, coun-
tries could not settle their international obliga-
tions by simply increasing their liabilities 
abroad. Hence, if a reserve currency country 
were in deficit, it would pay for it with assets, 
like any other country. The adjustment incen-
tive would appear as those assets were de-
pleted. 
(b) An account aimed at the substitution of 
SDRs for reserve currencies should be setup in 
the IMF. Its role would be to minimize 
pressure on exchange rates due to desired 
changes in foreign exchange portfolios of mo-
netary authorities. The countries issuing the 
currency accumulated in the account would 
recover it in an agreed period, in exchange for 
SDRs. In fact, this would be a form of short-
term debt consolidation for some industrial 
countries. As these countries recover their 
currencies from the account, the SDRs accu-
mulated there could be used for long-term 
lending to LDCs. One might call this operation 
the "substitution link". 
(c) Countries with net reserves higher 
than, say, 4 months ' imports and with reserves 
growing faster than a given rate per year would 
pay a tax on their reserves. One way to apply 
this concept, for example, would be not to 
allocate SDRs to such countries in a future 
allocation, the SDRs not allocated to them 
being assigned to LDCs in proportion to their 
quotas in the IMF. In this way, an incentive for 
surplus countries to adjust would be establish-
ed. One might call this the "adjustment link". 
(d) A debt refinancing facility should be 
established, perhaps as a joint undertaking of 
the World Bank and the IMF. This facility 
would operate under a system similar to that of 
the Oil Facility of the IMF. LDCs would have 
voluntary access to it on the basis of a pre-
established set of indicators, but the amount 
and conditions of refinancing would be studied 
case by case. A refinancing facility would be a 
natural L D C counterpart to a substitution 
account for reserve currency countries. 
(e) A forum should be established where 
monetary, trade and development matters, 
which are so closely linked, are regularly 
jointly discussed, with main tendencies being 
highlighted and policy measures suggested. 
Such a forum could assess the global contribu-
tion of each industrial country to development, 
taking into account their contribution both 
through trade and through aid and other finan-
cial flows. The ideal could be to create some 
form of international economic court that could 
pass judgement, particularly on restrictive 
trade practices, and establish compensation for 
the economic damage caused. Countries could 
then evaluate whether or not it was in their 
own interests to apply protectionist measures 
and to pay compensation for them. This con-
cept of "compensated protectionism" could be 
further evolved as a way to allow countries 
some freedom in this respect, but with compen-
satory payments to countries damaged in the 
process. The multipolarity of the present world 
lends some realism to this proposal. 
Of course, most of these ideas are neither 
new or realistic. However, the problem of 
development will be with us for a sufficiently 
long time to permit some unrealistic ap-
proaches at present. I believe that, as time 
passes, it will be increasingly clear that devel-
opment is not a problem of developing coun-
tries alone, but of the world as a whole. This is 
my justification for considering not only prob-
lems of the Latin American countries, or of all 
developing countries, but also problems of the 
world economy to which the latter are so 
closely linked. 
